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NOTES
FOSTERING  FREE  EXERCISE
Joseph R. Ganahl *
INTRODUCTION
Each child is “endowed by [its] Creator with certain unalienable
Rights,”1 and through the natural course of generation, with a mother
and father who are the presumptive guardians, not only of the child,
but of the child’s rights.  The law shows great reverence for the par-
ent-child relationship, and the State usually is very reluctant to inter-
fere with it.2  The task of the State in supervising the care of children
whose own parents are unable to care for them is a very weighty one.
When it becomes necessary for the State to act to protect the child
because of parental incapacity, neglect, disinterest, or abuse, the opti-
mal resolution is to work with the natural parents to solve whatever
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2013;
Bachelor of Arts in Music, University of California, Los Angeles, 1995.  I dedicate this
Note to my father, Robert, and my mother, Nancy, who gave me the gift of life and
from whose example and word I learned the meaning of marriage and fatherhood,
and to my wife, Hyeja, and my sons, Andrew, Matthew, Alexander, and Joseph, who
have been infinitely patient with me as I learn the art of marriage and fatherhood.  I
am grateful to Thomas Messner and Richard Garnett whose advice and
encouragement improved this Note immeasurably, and to the staff of the Notre Dame
Law Review who helped prepare this Note for publication.
1 Cf. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2 See Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977) (“[T]he right of
the family to remain together without the coercive interference of the awesome
power of the state . . . encompasses the reciprocal rights of both parent and children.
It is the interest of the parent in the ‘companionship, care, custody and management
of his or her children,’ and of the children in not being dislocated from the ‘emo-
tional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association,’ with the par-
ent.” (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. and Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
844 (1977) and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972))).
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problems have led to the State intervention and to reunite the family,
which is happily what occurs at least half of the time.3
While the State assumes the role of the parent, it is bound, both
morally and legally, to respect the rights that still reside with the legal
parents4 and to safeguard the child’s rights as well.  Among these are
the mutual rights of the parent to direct the child’s religious forma-
tion and of the child to exercise her religious beliefs, which are closely
intertwined.  In order to protect these rights, children are often
matched with religious foster agencies and families adhering to the
same faith as the child.  The question arises: what if there is a conflict
between the teachings of a religious group and the public policy of
the State?
A handful of states have terminated contracts or licenses of relig-
ious foster care agencies that refuse, based on their religious and
moral convictions, to place children in same-sex or unmarried cohabi-
tant households.  These states defend their actions by pointing to a
policy of prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
or marital status.  Applying such a policy in the context of foster care,
however, can undermine the interest that children and their parents
have in obtaining access to foster care providers that will embrace a
child’s faith and will reinforce the moral and religious formation that
parents have begun to impart to their child.  Any social benefits the
State is seeking to obtain by the elimination of certain religious foster
care providers is far outweighed by the costs to parents and children
3 See Kelsi Brown Corkran, Comment, Free Exercise in Foster Care: Defining the Scope
of Religious Rights for Foster Children and Their Families, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 325, 326
(2005); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMI-
LIES, THE AFCARS REPORT PRELIMINARY FY 2010 ESTIMATES AS OF JUNE 2011, available
at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_research/afcars/tar/report18.htm.
4 Some scholars argue that the concept of parents’ rights is ill-conceived. E.g.,
James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents’
Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1373 (1994) (“[T]he claim that parents should have
child-rearing rights . . . is inconsistent with principles deeply embedded in our law and
morality.”). But see Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restric-
tions, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 631, 675 (2006) (discussing the substantive due process rights
of parents to control their children’s upbringing and the particularly strong right of
parental speech).  Dwyer particularly addresses the suitability of state intervention in
the narrow range of cases where parents’ religiously motivated child-rearing decisions
are perceived as harmful to their children’s temporal interests.  Dwyer, supra at 1377.
The focus of this Note is on the dynamics of state intervention through foster care
placement generally, and does not seek to distinguish “parents’ rights” as a category
opposed to “children’s rights.”  For our purposes, “parents’ rights” may be considered
a placeholder for a broader conception of familial rights, subsuming the child’s right
to a stable family and the family’s right to preservation of its integrity and freedom
from undue interference. See supra note 2. R
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whose interest in religious matching is undermined.  This Note argues
that states should contract with a broad range of foster agencies, both
religious and secular, and should not discriminate against agencies
that utilize religious criteria in placing children with foster care
families.
Part I of this Note examines the primary legal arguments that
states have used to justify ending cooperation with certain religious
foster care providers.  As explained in Part II, the actions these states
have taken are problematic in light of state religious matching statutes
which encourage the placement of a child with a foster provider
adhering to the same beliefs as the child or her parents.  These relig-
ious matching statutes’ constitutionality has been upheld against
Establishment Clause challenges.  Further, the policy implicit in them
is buttressed by an independent “reasonable efforts” standard articu-
lated in several cases which deal with the free exercise rights of chil-
dren in the custody of the State and of the parents of those children.
Part III of this Note examines the how the First Amendment
rights of parents and children may be burdened by states’ refusal to
contract with religious foster care agencies and whether such a policy
is constitutionally permissible. Finally, Part IV offers a model statute
that would make explicit and more easily enforceable the First
Amendment assumptions that are implicit in religious matching
statutes.
I. TERMINATING CONTRACTS WITH RELIGIOUS AGENCIES
A. Broad Outlines of the Controversy
There has been increasing controversy over religious social ser-
vice agencies being forced to close because they decline to place chil-
dren with same-sex or unmarried cohabiting couples.5  The agencies’
objection to such placements arises from their conviction—often
influenced by religious belief—that the best interests of children are
5 See Pam Adams, Catholic Charities Seeks Ruling on Foster Care Contracts, PEORIA
JOURNAL STAR (July 11, 2011), http://www.pjstar.com/news/x1850043265/Catholic-
Charities-seeks-ruling-on-foster-care-contracts (discussing closures in Illinois);
Michelle Boorstein, Catholic Archdiocese Ends D.C. Foster-Care Program, WASH. POST,
Feb. 17, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/02/16/AR2010021604899.html (same in Washington, D.C.); Patricia
Wen, California Archdiocese to Reconsider Its Adoption Policy, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 10,
2006, at A16 (same in California and Boston).
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not served by such placements.6  Much of the focus has been on the
refusal to place children with same-sex couples, but in reality the
refusals are rooted in the deeply held belief of a broad range of per-
sons that placing a child with either a same-sex couple or an unmar-
ried cohabiting couple, whether for foster care or adoption, can be
harmful to the child’s moral and spiritual development.7
After changes in marriage law to include same-sex couples in a
number of jurisdictions—notably Massachusetts, California,8 and the
District of Columbia—religious providers’ state contracts or licenses
were terminated based on agencies’ unwillingness to place children
with same-sex couples.9  Even in Illinois, which extends marriage-like
domestic partnership benefits to same-sex couples but does not recog-
nize same-sex unions as equivalent to marriage, agencies were told by
6 The question of whether children in general are best served by placement with
a mother-father family is beyond the scope of this Note.  Suffice it to say that there is
broad disagreement on this issue.
7 A common objection to placement with same-sex couples is the lack of sexual
complementarity in the household—rooted in the understanding that mothers and
fathers play different roles in a child’s formation. See Congregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith, Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give Legal Recognition to Unions Between
Homosexual Persons ¶ 7 (2003), available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/
congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20030731_homosexual-unions
_en.html (arguing that a child adopted by a same-sex couple “would be deprived of
the experience of either fatherhood or motherhood”).  This is only a partial explana-
tion, however, and does not reconcile with objections to placement with unmarried
cohabiting couples or the willingness to place a child with a single person, or two
persons of the same sex in a non-sexual relationship. See Daniel Avila, Same-Sex Adop-
tion in Massachusetts, the Catholic Church, and the Good of the Children: The Story Behind the
Controversy and the Case for Conscientious Refusals, 27 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 1, 16 (2007)
(stating that Catholic teaching would have no objection to “placements involving
other parental settings, for example, by two sisters, by a single adult, or even by a
single adult ineligible to marry”).  The objection to placements with same-sex
couples—like the objection to placement with unmarried cohabiting couples—is
based on a disagreement with the couple’s moral values, not a simple rejection of
same-sex attraction.  See id. (explaining that the “focus [is] on the moral educational
capacities . . . regardless of sexual orientation”).
8 California currently does not include same-sex unions in its definition of mar-
riage, though it did for a short time in 2008 prior to the passage of Proposition 8.
The state’s position may change depending on the outcome of the litigation over
Proposition 8, however, and the future for religious agencies in the state is unclear.
9 See supra note 5.  Following up on a Vatican statement explaining that such R
placements are gravely immoral, Sean Cardinal O’Malley in Boston and Archbishop
George Niederauer in San Francisco directed Catholic Charities to adhere to Catholic
teaching by not placing any more children with same-sex couples. See Maggie Gal-
lagher, Banned in Boston, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, May 15, 2006, at A16, available at
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/191kgwgh.
asp; Wen, supra note 5. R
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the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) that they will
not be offered contracts if they do not agree to place children in
domestic partner households, whether same-sex or opposite-sex.10
Four agencies run by Catholic Charities in Illinois sued to prevent
the State from terminating their contractual relationship, which had
been ongoing for approximately forty years.11  In a crucial judgment
which virtually ended the litigation, the judge’s terse property-law
analysis sidestepped the complex arguments briefed by the two sides
in the case.12  After the State expedited the process of transferring the
care of children from Catholic Charities to other agencies, Catholic
Charities dropped its appeal to the circuit court’s grant of summary
judgment because it would be unable to maintain its facilities or pay
its employees pending the outcome of the suit once the contract fund-
ing was terminated.13  As the arguments briefed in Catholic Charities’
case are typical of those in other cases where contracts have been
denied or refused, they are examined in some detail below.
B. The Catholic Charities Case
The primary thrust of Catholic Charities’ argument was that the
State had explicitly denied renewal of its contract on illegal grounds,
10 Adams, supra note 5.  The first agency that was warned that it would have to R
choose between maintaining its placement policy or losing its contracts was Evangeli-
cal Child & Family Services of Wheaton, Illinois.  Second Amended and Supplemental
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions, and
Other Relief at Exhibit D-1, Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Springfield v. State,
No. 2011-MR-254 (Ill. App. Ct. July 26, 2011) [hereinafter Amended Complaint],
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/67942370/Illinois-Catholic-Charities-
Summary-of-Grounds-for-Entry-of-a-Stay-on-Foster-Care-Case.
11 After 90 Years, Catholic Charities Foster Care Will Cease in Illinois, THOMAS MORE
SOCIETY (Nov. 14, 2011), https://www.thomasmoresociety.org/2011/11/14/after-90-
years-catholic-charities-foster-care-will-cease-in-illinois-states-action-to-remove-children
-from-charities-care-forces-cessation-of-lawsuit/.  Ironically, Catholic Charities was
notified by the DCFS that they had received the highest rating for foster care in Illi-
nois four months after their contracts were not renewed. Catholic Charities: Stay Denied
to Stop Illinois from Taking Away Children – DCFS Gives Catholic Charities Highest Ranking
for Foster Care, THOMAS MORE SOCIETY (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.thomasmore
society.org/2011/1027/catholic-charities-stay-denied-to-stop-illinois-from-taking-away-
children-dcfs-gives-catholic-charities-highest-ranking-for-foster-care/.
12 Summary Judgment Order at 3, Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Spring-
field v. State, No. 2011-MR-254 (Sangamon Cnty., Ill., Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 2011) [herein-
after Summary Judgment Order], available at http://www.aclu-il.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/08/110818-Order-granting-Def-motion-for-SJ.pdf (“[T]he Plaintiffs
have failed to show that they have a legally recognized property right to renew their
contracts.”).
13 See After 90 Years, Catholic Charities Foster Care Will Cease in Illinois, supra note 11. R
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even after both parties had agreed to the terms of the new contract.14
The State contended that it was concerned with the harm that flowed
to foster children and foster parents from the agencies’ policies.15
Several claims supported each side’s contentions.
Catholic Charities main arguments in support of its position were
that (1) it was exempt as a sectarian agency from the Illinois Human
Rights Act,16 which bars only “non-sectarian” adoption agencies from
discriminating on the basis of marital status and sexual orientation;17
(2) even if the Human Rights Act could be construed to extend to
sectarian agencies, the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act18
would bar that interpretation as an impermissible burden on religion
in the absence of a compelling governmental interest;19 (3) the newly
passed “Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act”20 did not
implicate Catholic Charities inter alia because of a provision that
states: “Nothing in this Act shall interfere with or regulate the relig-
ious practice of any religious body.”21
The State attacked the first argument by arguing that Catholic
Charities was a state actor and could not raise religious defenses that a
14 See Amended Complaint, supra note 10, at 11. R
15 See Intervenors’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment at 3, Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Springfield v. State, No.
2011-MR-254 (Sangamon Cnty., Ill., Cir. Ct. Aug. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Intervenors’
Memorandum], available at http://www.aclu-il.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/
Intervenors-opposition-to-Plaintiffs-Motion-for-SJ-2.pdf.  The suit by Catholic Charities
was instigated in part, however, at the request of anonymous employees within the
DCFS who were concerned about the loss of Catholic Charities’ services. See Patrick
Yeagle, Catholic Groups Lose One Motion But Get Faster Appeal, CHI. DAILY L. BULLETIN
(Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.thomasmoresociety.org/docs/Chicago-Daily-Law-
Bulletin-Catholic-groups-lose-one-motion-but-get-faster-.pdf.  According to the inter-
venors’ own statement of “undisputed” facts, Catholic Charities is the only agency in
some areas. See Intervenors’ Memorandum, supra at 5 (“Catholic Charities also
admit, however, that in some areas, Catholic Charities is the only agency in the area
providing foster care services.”) (citations omitted).
16 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/101 (2011).
17 Amended Complaint, supra note 10, at 37–38. R
18 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1 (2011).
19 Amended Complaint, supra note 10, at 4–5.  They specifically argued that a less R
restrictive option would be to allow them to refer those cases that they were unable to
process in contravention of their religious beliefs. Id. at 8.
20 Public Act 096–1513 (passed June 1, 2011) (codified at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
75/1 et seq.).
21 Id. See also Amended Complaint, supra note 10, at 5–7 (noting that the spon- R
sors of the bill explicitly disclaimed any intention to “impede the rights that religious
organizations have to carry out their . . . duties and . . . religious activites [sic]” (quot-
ing the 136th Legislative Day, 96th Gen. Assembly, Regular Session, Sen. Transcript,
p. 81)).
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private agency could raise under the Human Rights Act.22  In
response to the second argument, the State claimed that the agency’s
free exercise rights were not substantially burdened because it was not
seeking a generally available government benefit, but the privilege of
providing services under a government contract.23  They argued fur-
ther that the State has a compelling interest in making contracting
agencies abide by its rules barring agencies from refusing to accept
unmarried couples as potential foster parents.24
The State first attempted to show a compelling interest by refer-
ring to decisions from other jurisdictions that have held that the state
has a strong interest in protecting the health and safety of children.25
Contending that a directive requiring children to be placed without
consideration of marital status was in the children’s best interests and
equivalent to a safety regulation,26 the State argued that religious
agencies’ request for exemption from such rules by asking for a refer-
ral system meant they were seeking “to operate in a way that violates
the children’s best interests.”27
The State also alleged a compelling interest by pointing out that
the State has an independent interest in eliminating discrimination
“[e]ven absent the protection of the Civil Union Act . . . .”28  The State
claimed that allowing a religious agency to maintain a policy in line
with its values would “erode public confidence in the state’s neutral-
ity,”29 and that the only remedy to such discrimination was to forbid it
completely.30  Lastly the State argued that Catholic Charities policy
stigmatized practicing homosexuals and sent the wrong message to
children, two harms the State has a compelling interest in
preventing.31
22 See Intervenors’ Memorandum, supra note 15, at 14–16. R
23 See id. at 22 (“Unlike unemployment benefits or the ability to hold office, a
state contract for youth residential services is not a public benefit.” (quoting Teen
Ranch v. Udow, 479 F.3d 403, 410 (6th Cir. 2007)).
24 Id. at 26.
25 Id. at 26–27.
26 Id. at 27.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 28.
29 Id. at 30.  They also quote Posner’s comment in a case holding that the state
could deny a police officer’s request to be excused from guarding an abortion clinic:
“The objection is to the loss of public confidence in governmental protective services
if the public knows that its protectors are at liberty to pick and choose whom to pro-
tect.” Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir. 1998)
(Posner, C.J., concurring)).
30 Id. at 32.
31 Id. at 33.
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There was no response to the plaintiffs’ third argument regard-
ing the interpretation of the Religious Freedom Protection and Civil
Union Act, other than to implicitly assume that DCFS was interpreting
it correctly.32  In sum, the State’s primary arguments were that (1)
religious agencies that contract with the State are state actors and
therefore barred from acting in ways not allowed to the State; (2) pro-
viding services such as foster care is not a generally available benefit,
and the State may contract with whomever it deems best; (3) religious
agencies’ consideration of marital status in selecting foster parents is
invidious discrimination that must be forbidden from consideration
because marital status has no role in determining whether a person
will make a good foster parent; (4) by allowing religious agencies to
use religious criteria that has a discriminatory effect, public confi-
dence in the State will be undermined; and (5) by considering marital
status, religious agencies stigmatize those whose lifestyles are not in
keeping with their values.
Each of these arguments, with the exception of (2), attacks a par-
ticular practice by religious agencies by setting it against an opposing
state interest.  The next Part discusses the extent to which the use of
religious criteria protects an important interest of children and their
parents: the right to free exercise of religion.
II. FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS OF FAMILIES AND CHILDREN
A family’s role in a child’s life extends well beyond meeting the
mere physical needs of the child.  The child is also dependent on the
family for its intellectual, emotional, moral, and spiritual develop-
ment.  These needs may vary significantly depending on the religious
identity of the child’s family.  Many states have provisions in place that
prescribe the matching of children with caretakers of the same faith
while in the custody of the state.  Such state religious matching stat-
utes that encourage in-religion placement of children in foster care
support the contention that, while a child’s material needs may gener-
ally be easily satisfied, there are elements of child rearing that are best
undertaken by those who embrace the same religious values as the
child.
A. Religious Matching Statutes
The manner in which states provide for the religious matching of
children with foster agencies or parents varies greatly.  Policies range
32 See, e.g., id. at 4 (stating that Catholic Charities declined to “comply” with the
Act as required by DCFS).
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from detailed prescription33 to total silence.34  Some states consider
religious matching of primary importance, with explicit reference to
the need to safeguard the child’s free-exercise rights.35  Others regard
it as a subsidiary factor to be considered when all else is equal.36  Some
states undertake matching whether the parents request it or not,37
and others only do so upon application by the child’s parents.38
While some of these statutes only require that children ultimately
be placed with families of the same faith as the child or its parents,39
others explicitly oblige the state to place children with agencies
33 New York has a statute containing seven subparts and over 700 words. See N.Y.
SOC. SERV. LAW § 373 (McKinney 2012).  New York is also the only state to have an
explicit constitutional provision:
When any court having jurisdiction over a child shall commit it or remand it
to an institution or agency or place it in the custody of any person by parole,
placing out, adoption or guardianship, the child shall be committed or
remanded or placed, when practicable, in an institution or agency governed
by persons, or in the custody of a person, of the same religious persuasion as
the child.
N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 32.
34 Many states have no statutory provision for religious matching in foster care,
but even in these states religion is one of the factors often considered in placing
children.  Corkran, supra note 3, at 327 n.11. R
35 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-D:23 (2012) (“The court and officials in
placing children shall, as far as practicable, place them in the care and custody of
some individual holding the same religious belief as the child or parents of the said
child, or with some association which is controlled by persons of like religious faith.
No child under the supervision of any state institution shall be denied the free exer-
cise of his religion or that of his parents, whether living or dead, nor the liberty of
worshipping God according thereto.”).
36 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-429(g) (2012) (“[T]he court shall give primary
consideration to the needs and welfare of the child. Where a choice of equivalent
services exists, the court shall, whenever practicable, select a person or an agency or
institution governed by persons of the same religion as that of the parents of the
child.”).
37 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-298 (2008) (“The court in committing juveniles
under the Nebraska Juvenile Code shall place them as far as practicable in the care
and custody of some individual holding the same religious belief as the parents of the
juvenile or with some association which is controlled by persons of like religious faith
of the parents of the juvenile.”).
38 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 4063 (2012) (“If the parents of a child in
the custody of the department request in writing that the child be placed in a family
of the same general religious faith, for foster care or adoption, the department shall
do so when a suitable family of that faith can be found.”).
39 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 418.280(4) (2011) (“Private child-caring agencies, in
placing children in private families, shall . . . [s]o far as practicable, place such chil-
dren in families of the same religious faith as that held by the children or their
parents.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL109.txt unknown Seq: 10  6-DEC-12 10:52
466 notre dame law review [vol. 88:1
directed by persons of the same faith as the child while waiting for
placement.40  Historically, many of the agencies caring for children
have been formed by religious communities, and quite frequently
each of the major faith traditions in a particular area will provide such
a service.41
Despite the variety of existing statutes and requirements, there
are two themes that run through most of them: the importance of
preserving the child’s faith,42 and the importance of protecting the
right of the parents to direct the child’s religious formation.43
B. Constitutionality of Religious Matching Statutes
Religious matching statutes have been challenged in both state
and federal courts and held to be constitutionally permissible.  The
most extensive challenge to a religious matching statute was played
out in New York and spanned more than fourteen years.44  The plain-
tiffs in the Wilder litigation sought to have New York’s constitutional
40 See supra note 37. R
41 See, e.g., Wilder v. Sugarman (Wilder I ), 385 F. Supp. 1013, 1019–21 (S.D.N.Y
1974) (detailing the history of foster care in New York).
42 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11264 (West 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46b-129(j) (West 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-12(j) (2012); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT.
10/13 (2012); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 683(D) (2004); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 5-520(a) (West 2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 211.221 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-298
(2008); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-509 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT § 62E.130 (2012); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 169-B:33 (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-26(a) (West 2012); N.Y. SOC.
SERV. LAW § 373 (McKinney 2012); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2151.32 (West 2012);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-4-705(A) (2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.280(4) (2011); 11 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 31 (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-41 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 63-15-20 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-5-506(b) (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-288
(2012).
43 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-28-106(b) (2012); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11264
(West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-103(93) (2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-
1602(31) (2012); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-3(13) (2007); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art.
116(24) (2004); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22 § 4063 (2011); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-
520(a) (West 2012); MINN. STAT. § 260C.193(3)(c) (2007); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 432B.550(2)(a) (2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:2(IX) (2012); OHIO REV.
CODE. ANN. § 2151.011(A)(48) (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-4-705(A)
(2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.280(4) (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-15-20 (2010); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 37-5-506(b) (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-288 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.34.260(1) (2004); W. VA. CODE § 49-2-1 (2009).
44 See Wilder v. Bernstein (Wilder III), 645 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d,
848 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1988); Wilder v. Bernstein (Wilder II), 499 F. Supp. 980
(S.D.N.Y 1980); Wilder I, 385 F. Supp. 1013.  This litigation was confined to the ques-
tion of religious matching in foster care.  An earlier action held religious matching in
adoption to be constitutionally permissible.  Dickens v. Ernesto, 281 N.E.2d 153, 156
(N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 407 U.S. 917 (1972).
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and statutory religious matching provisions declared contrary to the
U.S. Constitution, arguing that, inter alia, they were discriminatory
and violated the Establishment Clause.45
The district court recognized that the challenged provisions
struck a delicate balance between the free exercise rights of parents
and children on the one hand, and the countervailing concerns sur-
rounding state support for religion on the other.46  Citing Supreme
Court precedent including Pierce v. Society of Sisters47 and Wisconsin v.
Yoder,48 the court acknowledged that the state may not willfully inter-
fere with a child’s upbringing.49  It also admitted that the role of the
state becomes much more complicated when it is obliged to take cus-
tody of the child and step into the role of parent to safeguard the
child’s free exercise rights.50  The state would abdicate this duty if it
ignored the child’s spiritual training, but to provide such training
would squarely violate a literal interpretation of the Establishment
Clause.51  In order to resolve the tension, the court appealed to
Walz52:
45 Wilder I, 385 F. Supp. at 1018.  The Catholic and Jewish agencies in New York
enjoyed a good reputation for the quality of their service and had a capacity that
exceeded demand.  On the other hand the Protestant agencies did not have the
capacity to meet demand.  As a result, a disproportionate number of black, Protestant
children ended up in out-of-religion placement or in less desirable state-run facilities.
See Martin Guggenheim, State-Supported Foster Care: The Interplay Between the Prohibition
of Establishing Religion and the Free Exercise Rights of Parents and Children: Wilder v. Bern-
stein, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 603, 610–12 (1990).
46 Wilder I, 385 F. Supp. at 1025 (“This raises the question whether, since the
religious-matching statutes were enacted in recognition of the rights of parents and
foster children freely to exercise their religious beliefs, the public interest in free
exercise of religion entitles them to be upheld despite their involvement of the state
in religion.”).
47 268 U.S. 510 (1925).  “The child is not the mere creature of the State; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.” Wilder I, 385 F. Supp. at 1025
(quoting Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535).
48 406 U.S. 205 (1972).  “The essence of all that has been said and written on the
subject is that only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served
can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.” Wilder I, 385 F.
Supp. at 1025 (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215).
49 Wilder I, 385 F. Supp. at 1025.
50 See id. at 1026. “[T]he state must wear two hats, one as a surrogate parent
obligated to enforce the biological parent’s individual rights to provide religious
direction and the other as a government obligated to refrain from use of its powers to
further or inhibit religion.” Id.
51 Id.
52 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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Since the Religious Clauses, when in conflict, must be interpreted
flexibly so that “there is room for play in the joints productive of a
benevolent neutrality,” we believe that laws which might otherwise
be deemed violative of the Establishment Clause may be upheld
where they appear reasonably necessary to satisfy Free Exercise
rights and do not pose any serious danger to the public.53
In subsequent litigation, after many of the religiously affiliated
defendants were dismissed, the parties agreed to a settlement that
attempted to mitigate some of the harms that were alleged to flow
from the religious matching policy,54 but the provisions themselves
were allowed to stand.55  In its opinion upholding the terms of the
settlement, the Second Circuit stated that natural parents do not have
the constitutional right to demand that the state provide foster parent-
ing “under the religious auspices preferred by the parents,” but that
the state must at least make “reasonable efforts to assure that the relig-
ious needs of the children are met” while in the state’s care.56
C. What Does “Reasonable Efforts” Mean?
The state has virtually plenary control over the activities of a child
in foster care, including the child’s ability to engage in religious prac-
tice and receive religious formation.  A child’s moral and religious
development depends on continuous formation as much as the
child’s bodily development depends on proper nourishment and
physical activity, and the family’s (or foster family’s) role in that pro-
cess is indispensible.57  The “reasonable efforts” test recognizes that
53 Wilder I, 385 F. Supp. at 1026 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at
669).
54 See Wilder v. Bernstein (Wilder III ), 645 F. Supp. 1292, 1305 (S.D.N.Y 1986)
(detailing terms that prohibited agencies from reserving space for co-religionists and
limited religious matching when necessary to ensure access to quality foster care); see
also Guggenheim, supra note 45, at 622–24 (explaining the settlement and the
problems it was intended to solve).
55 Wilder v. Bernstein (Wilder IV ), 848 F.2d 1338, 1349 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[T]he
settlement on its face does not exceed an entanglement standard appropriate to the
context of state-sponsored child care in substitution of the responsibilities of
parents.”).
56 Id. at 1347.
57 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977) (“It is through the
family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and
cultural.”); Guggenheim, supra note 45, at 612 (“It is not so simple, and perhaps
impossible, to separate the bases on which children should be placed in certain foster
homes from the underlying question of how they should be raised in those homes.”);
see also Avila, supra note 7, at 16 (“Parental attitudes and life-style choices touching on R
fatherhood, motherhood, sexual identity and sexual behavior contribute to the moral
formation that a child receives and necessarily influences the child’s attitudes and life-
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the state may not hide behind the Establishment Clause and effec-
tively truncate the formation of a child in its family’s faith by refusing
to provide for continuity of religious formation while under the state’s
supervision.  After the Wilder decision, however, the actual content of
the “reasonable efforts” standard remained somewhat unclear and was
left to later decisions to interpret.
In Pfoltzer v. County of Fairfax,58 a mother brought suit alleging
that her and her children’s free exercise rights were violated by a fail-
ure to provide sufficient religious training to the children.59  The
defendants provided evidence that two of the three children were
placed with foster parents of the same faith, the foster parents were
given instruction and reading materials regarding the accommoda-
tion of the children’s faith, and they all made efforts to take the chil-
dren to church and religious instruction.60  The court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants, satisfied that the
mother’s and children’s rights were adequately observed.61
Walker v. Johnson62 also touched on the “reasonable efforts” stan-
dard.  In that case a mother who was dissatisfied with the exposure of
her children to the foster parents’ faith brought an action to enjoin
the foster parents from, inter alia, “promoting any religion [and] tak-
ing the children to church.”63  The court credited Walker’s assertion
that she had converted to Judaism after the children had been placed
with the foster family,64 but found that removing the children from
the foster home would not be in their best interest even though the
family made only slight effort to accommodate the mother’s demands
that they be raised in the Jewish faith.65  The court affirmed that
“[e]ven when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital
interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family
style choices.”); Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams’s Soul: Education and the
Expression of Associations, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1841, 1845 (2001) (“[F]amilies . . . are
mediating institutions that form, shape, and educate us by their expression.”).
58 775 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Va. 1991).
59 Id. at 877–78.
60 Id. at 886.  One of the children was even able to continue religious instruction
and receive First Communion while in the care of the foster parents. Id.
61 Id.
62 891 F. Supp. 1040 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
63 Id. at 1043.
64 Id. at 1046.  At the time of the children’s placement with the foster family,
their mother had disclaimed any religious belief, but later made various statements
suggesting that she was Catholic, atheist, or followed the tenets of Druidism. Id.
65 Id. at 1049.  The foster family gave the children food at Passover that was pro-
vided by the mother, but did not instruct the children in the Jewish faith. Id. at 1047.
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life.”66  It found, however, that the disruption involved in removing
the children to a different foster home outweighed the mother’s inter-
est in dictating that the children be instructed in her newfound relig-
ious beliefs,67 and that the state had not violated her First
Amendment rights.68  Though the “reasonable efforts” considered suf-
ficient by the court in Walker were vanishingly small, the fact that the
mother’s religious beliefs were indecisive likely played a role in the
decision.  Additionally, the mother had declined to express any relig-
ious preference at the time the children were originally placed, as
allowed by regulations promulgated by Children and Youth Services
in keeping with Pennsylvania law.69  While it is one thing for the foster
care system to be responsive to parents’ and children’s religious
wishes at the time of placement, it is another matter altogether for the
children’s care to be interrupted by a parent’s indecision regarding
religious matters.
A third case, Bruker v. City of New York,70 emphasizes that the “rea-
sonable efforts” test obligates child welfare agencies to take the free
exercise rights of parents seriously.  The plaintiff, Bruker, requested
that her two daughters be placed through a Jewish foster agency, but
the caseworker apparently disregarded the mother’s request and
made the initial placement of her fifteen-year-old daughter, Elianne,
with a Catholic foster parent.71  The foster parent encouraged Elianne
to attend synagogue and to observe Jewish dietary laws.72  Apparently,
the foster mother “displayed a woeful lack of knowledge with respect
to Jewish dietary laws,” however, and failed to receive instruction on
how to properly support Elianne’s faith.73  Elianne was later placed in
a Catholic foster facility.74  The girl drifted from her faith and eventu-
66 Id. at 1048 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).
67 Id. at 1049 (“[W]e do not read that [vital interest] as overriding the best inter-
ests of the child or endorsing a principle that would allow parental fiats to dictate that
the child be raised in a particular faith . . . after he or she has been placed in foster
care.”).
68 Id. at 1050 (granting summary judgment to defendants).
69 Id. at 1045.  The foster care regulations provided: “If a parent and/or child,
age 14 and older, states a religious preference at the time of placement, efforts will be
made . . . to place the child in a foster home where the same religion is practiced.” Id.
at 1046.
70 337 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
71 Id. at 544.
72 Id. at 546.
73 Id. (quoting In re Elianne Marcovitz, N-6300-1/92, at 4 (Sept. 24, 1992)).
74 Id. at 546–47.  The facility required its staff to encourage students to observe
the faith specified by their parents, and Elianne was treated in keeping with that pol-
icy. Id. at 547–48.  The facility inexplicably made the decision to send her to a Catho-
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ally converted to Catholicism after attaining her majority.75  The court
discredited the defendants’ claims that Bruker was not sincere in her
religious beliefs and that Elianne, her daughter, was sufficiently
mature to make her own choices regarding religious belief and
practice.76
In light of these three decisions, the “reasonable efforts” standard
articulated in Wilder takes on some substance.  Religious matching for
foster children is not strictly required, though it is encouraged in the
absence of significant obstacles.77  The State may fulfill its duty—even
without placing a child with a foster family or agency of the same
faith—when it makes a genuine effort to provide instruction regard-
ing the religious faith and practice of the child’s natural family and
ensures that the foster family or agency does make an effort to pre-
serve the child’s faith.78  Finally, while the natural parent may not
expect the State to “duplicate the standard of religious practice in the
parents’ home or satisfy the parents’ every request with respect to the
children’s religious instruction,”79 the State may not willfully disre-
gard the parents’ wishes, even if the child does not share the enthusi-
asm of the parents toward the family religion.80  Most notable is the
fact that the Pfoltzer, Walker, and Bruker courts delineated the require-
ments of “reasonable efforts” almost primarily by reference to the par-
ents’ First Amendment rights with only passing mention of the States’
various religious matching regulations.  The reasonable efforts stan-
lic high school, however, where she took classes in religion and morality and
participated in a Christian volunteer program. Id.
75 Id. at 549.
76 Id. at 552.  The court also noted that the assigned caseworker engaged in
deception and displayed animus toward Bruker. Id.
77 In dicta that probably reflected a lack of religious pluralism in Fairfax County,
Virginia in 1991, the Pfoltzer court noted that “a state has no duty to place a Buddhist
child with a Buddhist foster family, a Quaker child with a Quaker family, or a Zoroas-
trian child with a Zoroastrian family, unless such a family is reasonably and immediately
available.”  Pfoltzer v. Cnty. of Fairfax, 775 F. Supp. 874, 885 (E.D. Va. 1991) (empha-
sis added).
78 Compare supra note 60 and accompanying text, with supra notes 73–74 and R
accompanying text. See also Bruker, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 551 (“[T]o be reasonable, a
state’s efforts should also include some measure of supervision of the foster family’s
success in enabling the child’s religious practices, particularly if an in-religion place-
ment is not possible.”).
79 Pfoltzer, 775 F. Supp. at 885 (citing Wilder v. Bernstein (Wilder III ), 848 F.2d
1338, 1346–47 (2d Cir. 1988)); see also Walker v. Johnson, 891 F. Supp. 1040, 1049
(M.D. Pa. 1995) (“[T]he parent . . .  certainly does not retain an absolute right to
dictate, at whim, that the child be placed in a setting where he or she will receive
instruction in a particular religion.”).
80 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. R
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dard, protecting parents’ and children’s free exercise rights, both
reinforces and stands independent of a State’s religious matching
statutes.
Considering the significant number of entangling issues that may
arise as the State makes reasonable efforts to provide for the religious
formation of children in its care, the ideal solution is for a State to
contract with religious foster care agencies.  Religious agencies, stand-
ing independent from the State, have both the competence and flexi-
bility needed to consider religious matters in making decisions
regarding the care of children belonging to their own faith commu-
nity.  The fact that most states have statutes providing for religious
matching of children with social service agencies is a legislative nod to
the veracity of this proposition.81  A religious agency can more easily
assess the spiritual needs of the children of its faith community and
provide for their formation while they reside in a facility under the
agency’s control.  The religious agency is also uniquely qualified to
determine through the process of a home study whether a particular
household will be conducive to the continued healthy development—
both spiritual and otherwise—of such a child.  Most importantly, a
religious foster care agency is able to strike a proper balance between
the temporal and spiritual needs of children according to the relig-
ious values embraced by a particular faith community, a task that a
state agency or an agency under the control of persons of a different
81 The mutual dependence of the state and the religious social service agency is
confirmed by the following excerpt from the introduction to the New York Family
Court Act:
The landmark 1877 [Act for Protecting Children] legislation also
encouraged the growth of child care agencies, whether religious based or
nonsectarian.  By the mid-1870s each of the three major religions had
received legislative charters for child care agencies, completing New York’s
amalgam of sectarian and nonsectarian organizations devoted to receiving
and caring for children via voluntary surrender or judicial commitment.
The unique partnership between private child care agencies, which render
services, and the state, which provides funding and oversight, has been a
child protective hallmark for the past century and a half.
The paramountcy of the religious based organizations was strengthened
by an 1878 Act stipulating that children “. . . shall, if practicable, be commit-
ted to an asylum or reformatory that is governed or controlled by persons of
the same religious faith as the parents of such child.” The religious “match-
ing” provisions continues [sic], in modified form, today . . . .
Merril Sobie, Introductory Practice Commentaries, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT, art.10 (McKinney
2009) (citations omitted).
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faith, no matter how well intentioned, could fail to perform
adequately.82
III. CONSIDERING APPLICATION OF RELIGIOUS VALUES IN THE
FOSTER CARE CONTEXT
The plaintiffs in the Catholic Charities cases, as in other similar
actions, requested that they be allowed to continue taking religious
values into consideration in placing children.  The State of Illinois
criticized the religious agencies for taking a binary approach: the
religious agencies wanted to screen prospective foster parents using
certain disapproved criteria or they would not provide services.83  On
the other hand, the State offered its own binary solution: agencies
must either agree to stop using criteria that has the effect of discrimi-
nation—even if it is appropriate for the children in their care—or be
barred from caring even for children of their own faith on behalf of
the State.84
Both sides miss a legitimate middle ground.  Religious social ser-
vice agencies may continue serving those who share their religious val-
ues while remaining faithful to those values.  The State, for its part,
may decide whether or not such policies’ costs outweigh the benefits
for children from families not requesting religious placements with
those agencies.85  As explained in Part III.A, such a solution bridges
the gap between religious matching statutes and the “reasonable
efforts” standard on the one hand, and the concerns raised by the
State in Catholic Charities on the other.  It also has the benefit of avoid-
ing a constitutional collision, as discussed in Part III.B.
82 Cf. Bruker, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 555–56 (discussing the inexplicable decision by
an agency to enroll a Ms. Bruker’s daughter in a Catholic high school even while
making efforts to preserve her Jewish identity).
83 In one very real sense, Catholic Charities has no other option between screen-
ing unmarried couples and not placing children.  Under Canon Law, Catholic Chari-
ties is a part of the juridic person of the diocese and is bound to comply with the
directives of the local bishop.  The bishops in all of the dioceses involved with the
Illinois cases have barred Catholic Charities from placing children with same-sex
couples in keeping with the church’s teaching. See supra note 10. R
84 Summary Judgment Order, supra note 12, at 1–2.
85 This is a question of policy beyond the scope of this Note.
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A. How the Arguments Fit with “Reasonable Efforts” and
Religious Matching Statutes
1. Whether State Actors Are Barred from Acting upon Religious
Belief
Even assuming arguendo that religious foster agencies that con-
tract with the State are State actors it does not necessarily follow that
they may be barred from acting upon their religious beliefs.  Under a
number of circumstances, State actors are allowed to engage in activi-
ties that would otherwise be impermissible under the Establishment
Clause.  The Wilder I court discussed such situations:
There are certain practices, conceivably violative of the Establish-
ment Clause, the striking down of which might seriously interfere
with certain religious liberties also protected by the First Amend-
ment. Provisions for churches and chaplains at military establish-
ments for those in the armed services may afford one such example.
The like provision by state and federal governments for chaplains in
penal institutions may afford another example. It is argued that
such provisions may be assumed to contravene the Establishment
Clause, yet be sustained on constitutional grounds as necessary to
secure to the members of the Armed Forces and prisoners those
rights of worship guaranteed under the Free Exercise Clause.86
Religious foster care agencies serve a purpose under religious
matching statutes and the “reasonable efforts” test, and a key part of
that purpose is guarding the free exercise rights of the children in
their care.87  The State is encouraged to engage their services specifi-
cally so they may exercise their religious judgment.  Even if they are
State actors, religious foster agencies not only may make decisions
influenced by the religious values of the children of the same faith
entrusted to their care, but under religious matching statutes and the
reasonable efforts test they are implicitly required to do so.
2. Whether Contracts to Provide Foster Care Are a Generally
Available Benefit
Under most circumstances, contracting to provide social services
is not a generally available benefit, as pointed out by the State of Illi-
nois in Catholic Charities.88  The operation of a job training center,
86 Wilder v. Sugarman (Wilder I ), 385 F. Supp. 1013, 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (quot-
ing Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296–97 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring)).
87 See supra Part II.
88 Supra note 23 and accompanying text. R
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soup kitchen, or non-sectarian youth residence can be handled by the
State, or contracted out to a private agency.  No particular claimant,
sectarian or otherwise, has a presumptive right to a government con-
tract to perform such services.  Contracting for foster care services
under religious auspices is not the same as contracting with agencies
for other social services because the services offered in the latter case
are largely secular, whereas the relationship of a religious foster
agency vis-a`-vis the persons it serves will very likely involve questions of
a sectarian nature.89
The question is not whether contracts to provide foster care are a
generally available benefit to the agencies, but whether contracting
with religious agencies is a generally available benefit to the children
in the agencies’ care.  As has been explained, the State is obligated to
make reasonable efforts to guard parents’ and children’s free exercise
89 It is worthwhile to quote Wilder I at length on this point:
Even assuming non-sectarian agencies were located or constructed, new con-
stitutional problems would be encountered.  Plaintiffs argue that, if foster
children were placed in such homes and agencies, the state could satisfy the
religious rights of the children and their parents by arranging, according to
each child’s religious needs, for the child to attend religious services and
obtain religious instruction at an outside church, synagogue or other place
of worship.  Although this simplistic proposal may appear at first blush to
have some merit, further consideration discloses serious problems, due prin-
cipally to the radically differing needs of the thousands of foster children
who are the beneficiaries of state aid.  The parents of a child brought up as a
Congregationalist, for instance, might be satisfied with a ‘“weekly session” of
[S]unday school followed by a short service, even though the tendency of
many Protestant sects has been toward an increase in communal religious
activities.  But a child raised as a Hassidic Jew would demand a far more
pervasive religious upbringing of the type associated with orthodox Judaism,
including observance of dietary rules, the Sabbath, attendance at Temple,
and continued close affiliation with others of his same religious persuasion.
It requires no imagination to appreciate that Quakers, Moslems, Seventh
Day Adventists and those of many other religious persuasions would
undoubtedly assert perfectly reasonable demands necessitating wide varia-
tion in the handling by the state of children of these religions if the state
were to satisfy their needs, which far exceed the normal requirements of an
adult, since the child, in addition to its participation in the practice of relig-
ion, usually receives religious education.  In our view, the state, if it were
required in each case to be responsible for such ‘“custom-tailoring” of each
child’s religious training, determining the extent of a child’s participation in
communal religious activities of his persuasion and supervising the child’s
transportation to and custody at such activities, would be hopelessly entan-
gled in religion, far beyond its existing simple relationship with foster par-
ents and religious institutions, under which the latter assume all of these
responsibilities for the child’s religious education.
Wilder I, 385 F. Supp. at 1028–29.
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rights while children are in state custody,90 and the placement of a
child with an agency unequal to the religious needs of a child could
constitute a constitutional violation.91  The case is even stronger when
there is an explicit provision in state law providing for the safeguard-
ing of children’s and their parents’ free exercise rights through relig-
ious matching.  The State may not evade its responsibility through
selective contracting or by imposing regulations that create a burden
for certain religious believers because of the disapproval of particular
doctrines or religious practices.92  The State is also prohibited from
purposely contracting only with secular private agencies so as to avoid
the problem altogether.93
3. Whether the Consideration of Marital Status in Placement
Constitutes Discrimination
One of the most contentious issues—the very wellspring from
which the Catholic Charities dispute arose—is the question of whether
the consideration of marital status is relevant to a foster placement
decision.  As alluded to in the introduction to this Part, the two camps
have staked out differing positions.  The defendant in Catholic Chari-
ties holds the view that the use of religious criteria to screen out same-
sex or unmarried cohabitants in selecting foster parents is invidious
discrimination that must be forbidden, alleging that marital status has
no role in determining whether a person will make a good foster par-
ent.94  Implicit in the plaintiffs’ argument is the contention that the
marital status of those who care for children is relevant to their inter-
ests, and that they are bound in conscience to act in keeping with that
belief.  Setting to one side the question of whether marital status is
relevant in all cases, another reasonable question to ask is not whether
foster placement with a same-sex or unmarried cohabiting couple will
be harmful to the development of a generic child, but whether such a
90 See supra Part I.
91 See supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text.
92 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532
(1993) (“At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law
at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits
conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons.” (emphasis added)); Larson v.
Valente  456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (“The State may not adopt programs or prac-
tices . . . which ‘aid or oppose’ any religion. . . . This prohibition is absolute.” (quoting
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968))).
93 “The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion
and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.” Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104
(1968) (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947)).
94 Intervenors’ Memorandum, supra note 15, at 7–8. R
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placement is consistent with the needs of a particular child, and con-
ducive to eventual family reunification.
The parents’ inability to care for the child does not eliminate all
of their rights as parents.95  As discussed in Part II, supra, the right to
direct the child’s religious upbringing is among the rights that are not
abandoned by the parents when the State takes custody of the child.
The child also has an independent right to seek accommodation from
the State for his or her spiritual needs.96  For children generally,
appropriate religious formation could include instruction in the relig-
ious view of the family and the respective obligations of family mem-
bers.  For adolescents, it could include instruction in the religious
understanding of marriage and the marital relationship.97  The State
cannot fulfill its duty to make reasonable efforts to safeguard the
child’s faith by placing a child whose religion holds certain lifestyles as
contradictory to its teachings in a foster household that espouses such
a lifestyle and then offering materials to the foster parents regarding
the tenets of that faith which they are likely to find offensive.98  To do
so would make a mockery of the reasonable efforts standard.
95 Walker v. Johnson, 891 F. Supp. 1040, 1048 (M.D. Pa. . 1995) (“A parent’s right
to rear her children as she sees fit is not eviscerated solely because she has not been a
model parent or has temporarily lost custody of her children to the state.”).
96 Wilder I states:
A further duty assumed by the state as a surrogate parent is that of fulfil-
ling the child’s Free Exercise rights . . . . This [is] accomplished by providing
such spiritual and moral training as is appropriate or desired.  To deny the
child this education, which is necessary for his enjoyment of Free Exercise
rights, would represent the very ‘governmental interference with religion’
that is barred by the First Amendment.
Wilder v. Sugarman (Wilder I ), 385 F. Supp. 1013, 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (quoting
Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
97 For Catholics in particular, a proper understanding of the Church’s teaching
regarding the ends of marriage is essential in order to enter into a valid Christian
marriage. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH §§ 1625–32, 1662–63 (2d ed.
2000) (explaining that in order for a marriage to be valid the spouses’ consent must
have as its object “true Matrimony” as taught by the church).  Catholic belief counsels
that “the ‘sexual dimension of the person and his or her ethical values’ are closely
linked.  Thus, children should be taught to know and respect moral norms, enabling
them to enjoy ‘responsible growth in human sexuality,’” and that “ ‘[n]o one is capa-
ble of giving moral education in this delicate area better than duly prepared parents.’”
Avila, supra note 7, at 16. (citations omitted).  Avila also notes that a Catholic agency R
may decline to facilitate placement with a same-sex couple “based, in effect, on a
determination that the couple is not ‘duly prepared’ to provide a child with proper
moral formation.” Id.  The same concern would extend to any unmarried cohabiting
couple, regardless of orientation.
98 The court in Bruker was critical of the State’s lack of intervention due to the
foster mother’s “woeful lack of knowledge” regarding Jewish religious observance.
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Additionally, it must be remembered that the goal of foster care
is usually to provide care for a child pending reunification with the
parents.99  It goes without saying that the State must avoid exacerbat-
ing any injury that has already accrued to the child or creating new
obstacles to family cohesion.  Though the State cannot be expected to
create a foster care setting that reproduces the child’s family in every
detail, it should not deviate more than necessary.100  A significant part
of a child’s home setting may be religious observance (or the absence
thereof), and so this should be considered in choosing a foster home
setting.  Placing a child in a foster home with different religious prac-
tices or values inimical to the child’s upbringing could further trauma-
tize an already vulnerable child.
Depending on the length of stay and the age of the child, given
the subtle influence—whether intentional or not—that a foster par-
ent can exercise over a young, impressionable child’s thinking, living
with a foster family with different values could also engender ambiva-
lence or hostility toward the parents’ values that could cause addi-
tional familial discord upon reunification.101  Imagine if a child—who
was particularly susceptible to suggestion due to displeasure over trou-
bles at home—was placed with a family with strong, religiously moti-
vated values different from the legal parents.  The child might
associate the affection of the foster parents and the relative tranquility
of the foster household with the beliefs of the foster parents.  When
the time came for reunification, the child might take a critical stance
toward the legal parents’ beliefs or even refuse to return home.  As
the court in Walker remonstrated “[e]ven when blood relationships
Bruker v. City of N.Y., 337 F. Supp. 2d 539, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citation omitted).  A
court should likewise be unimpressed with the meager efforts by a state which places a
child with a foster family modeling behavior directly contradictory to the child’s relig-
ious faith and directs them to “accommodate” the child’s beliefs.
99 See supra note 3 and accompanying text; Guggenheim, supra note 45, at 610 R
(“[F]oster care involves the temporary care of someone else’s children with the ulti-
mate goal of reuniting parent and child.”); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 13.32A.210 (West 2011) (“In an attempt to minimize the inherent intrusion in the
lives of families involved in the foster care system and to maintain parental authority
where appropriate, the department, absent good cause, shall follow the wishes of the
natural parent regarding the placement of the child.”).
100 See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text.  But see Guggenheim, supra note R
45, at 610 (“Since foster care is expressly meant to be temporary, parents ought to be R
able to insist that the conditions upon which their children are kept in foster care are
consistent with the values of the family with which they will ultimately be reunited.”).
101 The situation in Walker apparently created significant friction between the
mother and her children.  Walker v. Johnson, 891 F. Supp. 1040, 1046–47 (M.D. Pa.
1995).
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are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretriev-
able destruction of their family life.”102
It does no good to simply consider screening for marital status a
mere matter of religious judgment that constitutes invidious discrimi-
nation.  The State itself should be mindful of the marital status of pro-
spective foster parents, if only in the sense that they would consider
dietary preferences when placing an Orthodox Jewish child, or a pro-
clivity for ostentatious living when placing an Amish child.103  If the
State should consider marital status in the case of certain religiously
observant children, there is no reason the State should deny a con-
tract with a religious agency that applies the same standards when car-
ing for those children.
4. Whether Public Confidence Will Be Undermined by Allowing
Religious Agencies to Screen Candidates Based on
Religious Criteria
The fourth argument advanced by the intervenors is that, by
allowing religious agencies to use criteria that have a discriminatory
effect, public confidence in the State will be undermined.  As dis-
cussed in Part III.A.3, supra, the State may have an obligation to
examine marital status in placing children from certain religiously
observant households in a way that will result in the same outcome as
if a religious agency was engaged to make the placement.  Since it will
be more difficult for the State to explain its deference to religious
values if it takes such actions directly,104 it would create less of an
appearance of entanglement if the State simply fulfills its duty under
the reasonable efforts test or a religious matching standard by entrust-
ing the children to the care of a religious agency that is presumed to
have the latitude to consider religious values.  In protecting free exer-
cise rights, as in protecting free speech rights, the government will
often end up in the awkward position of looking like it is endorsing a
particular view, when it is merely facilitating a fundamental constitu-
tional right.105  The government, however, cannot be squeamish
102 Id. at 1048 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).
103 See Catherine L. Hartz, Arkansas’s Unmarried Couple Adoption Ban: Depriving Chil-
dren of Families, 63 ARK. L. REV. 113, 129 (2010) (“Sexual orientation is not irrelevant
and neither is a couple’s marital status.  These factors should be considered in placing
the child with the best fit—just like education level, income, and other lifestyle
considerations.”).
104 See supra note 89. R
105 Cf. Volokh, supra note 4, at 698–99 (“We may generally speak even if our R
speech undermines others’ enjoyment of their rights: For instance, people have a
Free Speech Clause right to urge a boycott of a newspaper, so as to pressure the
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about offending the uninformed observer and thereby trample genu-
ine rights.106
5. Whether by Considering Marital Status, Religious Agencies
Stigmatize Those Whose Lifestyles Contradict Their
Teachings
As suggested above, if the State finds that the harm that flows to
the children not sharing the faith of a religious agency outweighs the
benefits of placing a child with such an agency, it is free to contract
with that agency only to care for children of the same faith.  An Evan-
gelical family is not likely to apply to foster a child through an agency
specializing in observant Jewish children, understanding that the
agency would wish to find a kosher household in which to place its
charges.  Likewise, a same-sex or unmarried co-habiting couple can be
expected to understand that some religious agencies have specific
standards when placing children and that their household would not
be suitable.107
The real problem seems to be that some states have changed
their policies regarding the recognition of different types of living
arrangements, while continuing to depend heavily on religious social
service agencies whose longstanding religious beliefs conflict with
such arrangements.108  The State, if it feels compelled to encourage
newspaper to fire a columnist, even though this speech is intended to stop others
from exercising their own free speech rights.  Likewise, people have a Free Speech
Clause right to criticize religions and their adherents, speak out against the war effort,
urge racial, religious, or sexual discrimination, and so on.  Though such speech may
undermine constitutional ‘values,’ such as religious freedom, the war power, or equal-
ity, it doesn’t literally violate constitutional rights (since constitutional rights can gen-
erally be violated only by the government).  There’s no real conflict between
constitutional provisions in such cases, only an argument that restricting a constitu-
tional right is justified by some interest that echoes a right constitutionally protected
against government suppression, or echoes a constitutionally granted federal power—
and the Court has generally rejected this argument.”).
106 “[T]he District was bound to take account of the fact that he was exercising a
constitutional right and that accommodation of uninformed and prejudiced persons
was not a compelling state interest outweighing that exercise.”  Peterson v. Minidoka
Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 331, 118 F.3d 1351, 1357 (9th Cir. 1997).
107 See Paul Vitello, Faith Groups Campaign to Block Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, (May
5, 2011) at A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/nyregion/new-
york-faith-groups-work-to-block-gay-marriage.html# (quoting Senator Liz Krueger as
saying “[m]y guess is that most same-sex couples skip over the Catholic adoption ser-
vices in the Yellow Pages”).
108 Catholic Charities in Illinois seems to have become a victim of its own success.
If it had not provided superior service and support for foster children and families, see
supra note 11, or expanded its facilities to accommodate children of all faiths, ending R
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alternative family forms, should not “throw the baby out with the
bathwater” by cutting off the availability of religiously sensitive foster
care for certain religious observers, but rather reduce its dependency
on religious agencies for out-of-religion placement if it so desires.
Given that a large proportion of existing foster providers are probably
already willing to work with same-sex or unmarried cohabitant house-
holds,109 the benefits that would come from forcing religious agencies
out of business are far outweighed by the detrimental effect on the
children and families interested in their services.
B. Constitutional Considerations in Denying Contracts on the
Basis of Religious Belief
While much of the back and forth in the Catholic Charities case
revolved around the free exercise rights of the religious agency itself,
as is apparent from the discussion in Parts II and III.A, supra, the free
exercise rights of parents and children are also implicated.  When the
State refuses to contract with a religiously affiliated agency, in the long
run it is the families that belong to the religious community that sup-
ported the agency that suffer the most.110  Unfortunately, both parties
to this action failed to adequately address this important issue.
As explained in Part III.A.2, supra, if a state contracts with private
foster care providers, that state may not refuse to contract with relig-
ious agencies in an attempt to evade its duty under the reasonable
efforts standard.  Not only would such a course of action be unconsti-
tutional, but the State would have to undertake the burden of making
appropriate matching decisions itself, possibly applying the same stan-
dards it finds unacceptable.111  More importantly, while a state may
up with contracts to handle a large proportion of DCFS’s cases, they may have been
able to remain in service, at least caring for Catholic families.
109 Cf. DAVID M. BRADZINSKY & EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., EXPANDING
RESOURCES FOR CHILDREN III, at 15 (2011), available at http://adoptioninstitute.org/
publications/2011_10_Expanding_Resources_BestPractices.pdf (last visited Sept. . 10,
2012) (relating the results of studies that show that “a substantial percentage of
[adoption] agencies are interested in working with lesbian and gay clients”).
110 Press Release, Diocese of Springfield in Illinois, Statement of Most Reverend
Edward K. Braxton, Bishop of Belleville, Most Reverend R. Daniel Conlon, Bishop of
Joliet, and Most Reverend Thomas John Paprocki, Bishop of Springfield in Illinois
Regarding the Ending of Appeals of Foster Care Litigation (Nov. 14, 2011), available
at http://www.thomasmoresociety.org/docs/Statement-re-end-of-appeals-Springfield-
11-14-2011.pdf (“While the State has forced the Catholic Church out of state-sup-
ported foster care and adoption services, the losers will be the children, foster care
families and adoptive parents who will no longer have the option of Catholic, faith-
based services.”).
111 See supra Part III.A.3.
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condition the receipt of some benefits on compliance with certain
standards,112 it may not do so without considering whether there are
countervailing factors that balance the harm sought to be remedied
by attaching those conditions.113  The countervailing factors in this
case are the child’s free exercise rights and parents’ right to guide the
child’s formation.
The constitutionality of religious matching statutes, in spite of
their tension with a literal interpretation of the Establishment Clause,
demonstrates that the protection of free exercise rights is a compel-
ling interest that overbalances other significant constitutional con-
cerns in the foster care context.114  It is insufficient to say that the
interest in outlawing invidious discrimination justifies a blanket ban
on the consideration of marital status even when it is relevant to pro-
tecting the free exercise rights of children in the foster care system
and when such limited consideration has only an incidental discrimi-
natory effect.  The State can surely find a more narrowly crafted rem-
edy that will not impinge on other fundamental rights.115  The State
certainly may not go so far as to interfere with religious observance by
preventing children from being formed in the religious beliefs of
their parents while in foster care because it disapproves of their relig-
ious doctrine.  But that is precisely the outcome that will be allowed if
the State is permitted to discriminate against selected religious foster
care based only on their adherence to religious values when caring for
children.
The policy of barring any consideration of marital status, which
itself discriminates on the basis of religious doctrine, not only tends to
112 Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 592 (1983) (stating that the
government may decline to extend a benefit—in that case, a tax deduction—to a
charitable institution whose purpose is “so at odds with the common community con-
science as to undermine any public benefit that might otherwise be conferred”).
113 Cf. id. (“[A] declaration that a given institution is not ‘charitable’ should be
made only where there can be no doubt that the activity involved is contrary to a
fundamental public policy.”).
114 Wilder v. Bernstein (Wilder III ), 848 F.2d 1338, 1349 (2d Cir. 1988); see also
Wilder v. Sugarman (Wilder I ), 385 F. Supp. 1013, 1025 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (“‘The
essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those interests
of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims
to the free exercise of religion.’” (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215
(1972)).
115 For example, limiting the use of religious agencies that apply such screens to
children of the same faith.  The problem faced by the court in Wilder III—the lack of
access to quality care in other agencies, see supra note 54—is apparently absent in R
recent cases where the state has been able to quickly transition children to other
institutions upon terminating existing contracts. See After 90 Years, Catholic Charities
Foster Care Will Cease in Illinois, supra note 11. R
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coerce religious agencies to conform to the State’s preferred “doc-
trine,” but it has a punitive effect on members of select religions.  It
denies them access to a generally available state benefit, namely the
right to have the State make reasonable efforts to safeguard their free
exercise rights when their children are in state custody.  In a state with
religious matching statutes in place, discrimination against a religious
body on the basis of its beliefs is all the more blatant for its violation of
explicit public policy.  Parents and children of the targeted faith are
burdened in their free exercise rights because they are unable to rely
on the services of the agency that is best able to safeguard their inter-
ests—not because an agency is not reasonably and immediately availa-
ble, but because the State has foreclosed its use based on religious
criteria, leaving those families with unequal access to state services.
These families must trust that the State which has exhibited animus
toward their religious values will adequately protect their right to
guide the religious formation of their children while in foster care.
It should not be forgotten that the home is one of the key places
where religious freedom and counter cultural norms flourish.  Chil-
dren are already exposed to government sponsored speech in public
schools and through the media.  Allowing the State to manage the
upbringing of children by approving or disapproving of religious
beliefs gives the State plenary control over the influences that will
guide the formation of children.  This is a power that the government
should not be permitted to wield, even over the relatively small num-
ber of children in foster care.116  As Judge Posner admonished in Rod-
riguez v. City of Chicago,117 there will be a “loss of public confidence in
governmental protective services if the public knows that its protectors
are at liberty to pick and choose whom to protect.”118
IV. A MODEL RELIGIOUS MATCHING STATUTE
Religious matching statutes are imbued with the spirit of the First
Amendment, but only rarely is that explicit in the actual text of the
statute.  This section, drawing on the discussion in Part III, supra, sug-
gests a model statute that will clarify the assumptions that underlie
such statutes to allow for easier interpretation and enforcement.
116 Cf. Volokh, supra note 4, at 681 (“Government power to coercively restrict R
parental speech, on top of its power to engage in its own speech in public schools,
would tend to cement existing orthodoxies and suppress potentially valuable but
unpopular ideas.”).
117 156 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 1998).
118 Id. at 779 (Posner, J., concurring).
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Model Act for Religious Matching in Foster Care Placement
§ 1. Purpose. – When selecting appropriate foster placement for chil-
dren in the custody of the State, the determination of a child’s
best interests presupposes a consideration of many aspects of a
child’s development.  Religious identity may have a strong influ-
ence on various facets of a child’s family life and upbringing.
The purpose of this Act is to help minimize the disruption in
family life that may be caused by involvement with the foster care
system by ensuring a child’s right to free exercise of religion
while cared for by foster care providers in this State, as well as to
ensure the parents’ right to have a voice in their child’s moral
and spiritual formation during the duration of their separation
from their child.
§ 2. Religious Matching.
(a) Placement.
(1) Religious Placement. – In placing a child in foster care,
as far as is practicable, a child shall be placed in the cus-
tody or care of an agency, institution, facility, or group
home affiliated with the same religion as that of the
child, or in the custody or care of an individual or family
practicing the same religion as that of the child.
(2) Non-religious placement. – If the child’s legal parents so
request, the child shall be placed in the custody or care
of a secular agency, institution, facility, or group home,
or in the custody or care of a non-religiously-observant
individual or family.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) The provisions in paragraph (a) of this section shall not
apply if the child is placed with a relative within the sec-
ond degree.
(2) The child’s legal parents may waive the requirements in
subsection (a) of this section in their entirety through a
signed writing.
(c) Notification. – In the case that the exceptions listed in sub-
section (b) of this section are inapplicable, if the child is not
placed in accordance with the requirements in subsection
(a) of this section, then the parents of the child and the
court having jurisdiction over the child shall be notified in a
writing that shall recite the facts which impelled such disposi-
tion to be made contrary to the religious faith of the child.
(d) Reasonable Efforts. – In all cases, reasonable efforts shall be
made to ensure that the child is provided appropriate relig-
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ious formation and the free exercise of religion, including
the right to engage in worship.
§ 3. Impermissible Conditions.
(a) No court or agency of this State, as a condition of placing a
child in the custody or care of a religiously affiliated foster
care agency, institution, facility, or group home, or individ-
ual or family, under the requirements of this Act, shall com-
pel such agency, institution, facility, group home, individual,
or family to undertake any course of action which is contrary
to the religious beliefs of such entity or individual.
(b) No court or agency of this State may refuse, or promulgate
regulations which effectively prevent, the placement of a
child in the custody or care of a religiously affiliated foster
care agency, institution, facility, or group home, or individ-
ual or family, under the requirements of this Act, because of
the religious beliefs of such entity or individual.
§ 4. Interpretation.
(a) For purposes of this Act, the term “non-religiously-observant
individual or family” shall be interpreted to mean an individ-
ual or family that expresses no particular religious affiliation.
(b) The provisions of this Act shall be enforceable against the
State and its agents only, and shall not be construed to create
a right of action against any private entity.
(c) The provisions of this Act shall be interpreted, and any regu-
lations in relation to this Act shall be formulated, so as to
assure the furtherance of the purposes stated in section 1 of
this Act.
This model statute is intended to provide robust protection for
free exercise rights—including deference to the wishes of parents,
whether religiously observant or not—while maintaining flexibility for
the State.  It guides the relationship between the State and care prov-
iders by encouraging cooperation, but discouraging unnecessary
entanglement.  It explicitly promotes the right of children and fami-
lies to have access to facilities that are sensitive to their religious needs
and allows such facilities to have recourse to religious criterion when
caring for and placing children, but allows the State to restrict its
cooperation with such agencies, if desired, to caring for children of
the same faith.
CONCLUSION
Parents are presumed to know what is best for their own children.
Even when the State must take custody of a child due to the inability
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or failure of parents to provide for a child’s temporal wellbeing, the
State must show respect for the parents’ right to direct the religious
and moral formation of that child.  This is especially true in the case
of foster care, where reunification with the family is the ultimate goal.
Many states have religious matching statutes demonstrating recogni-
tion of the importance of respecting both parents’ and children’s free
exercise rights.  But even in the absence of such a provision, the State
must make reasonable efforts to accommodate the foster child and his
or her parents in the exercise of their First Amendment rights.  Relig-
ious foster agencies play an invaluable role in assisting the State not
only in caring for large numbers of foster children of all religions and
no particular religion, but also, when requested, in caring especially
for co-religionists by safeguarding their free exercise rights.
States have found it convenient, because of the high quality of
care that religious agencies provide, to contract a large proportion of
their cases with them.  With the proliferation of non-traditional house-
holds in twenty-first-century America, states are faced with a dilemma.
Though societal mores have shifted somewhat, many religious com-
munities have held fast to their perennial teachings regarding the
religious and moral implications of different lifestyles.  Religious agen-
cies associated with those communities often adhere to those tradi-
tional values and desire to guard children from what they view as the
negative formational influence of households composed of same-sex
couples or unmarried co-habitants and will not place foster children
in such households.  At the same time, the State would like to please
advocates of alternative lifestyles who wish for greater participation in
the foster care system, as well as expand the pool of eligible foster
parents by disallowing consideration of marital status.
This Note suggests that states can limit contracting with selected
religious foster agencies, if that is consistent with the States’ view of
the best interests of some children, but that they may not deny con-
tracts altogether based on the agencies’ religiously motivated policies.
Religious foster agencies have a distinctive role under religious match-
ing statutes and the reasonable efforts test, both of which exist to safe-
guard the free exercise rights of legal parents and children who find
themselves involved with the foster care system, for whatever reason.
By making available a range of services, both sectarian and non-secta-
rian, the government simply acknowledges the fact that “[t]he child is
not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct
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his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations.”119
119 Wilder I, 385 F. Supp. at 1025 (quoting Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
535 (1925)).
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